81
ARTICLE
Continuity and Change: Comparing the
Securitization of Migration under the Obama
and Trump Administrations
Hugh HUTCHISON
1
*
Abstract
One of the most contested issues in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election was
immigration: in particular, irregular migration across the U.S. border with Mexico.
is paper seeks to examine the extent to which the securitization of immigration
is an “isolated phenomenon” endemic to the Trump Administration, as opposed
to a reality of U.S. policymaking that has pervaded previous administrations.
By contrasting the immigration platform of the current administration with
that of its predecessor, led by Barack Obama, this paper will assert that, despite
the intensication of rhetoric against irregular migrants, much of the Trump
Administrations response to immigration from the Southern border has been
informed by, and is directly continuous with, actions taken by Obama between
2008 and 2016. It will argue that the same three factors: the post 9-11 conception
of migration as an inherent threat, the deportation regime and the securitization
(and sometimes militarization) of the southern border, have rendered the last
decade of American immigration policy more or less consistent, despite vastly
dierent stated ideological underpinnings.
Keywords
U.S. immigration policy, deportation regime, homeland security, U.S.-Mexico
border, securitization of immigration.
* MA Student, Marmara University, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
İstanbul, Turkey. E-mail: [email protected]. ORCID: 0000-0003-0226-108X.
Received on: 16.02.2020
Accepted on: 12.05.2020
PERCEPTIONS, Spring-Summer 2020 Volume XXV Number 1, 81-98.
Hugh HUTCHISON
82
Introduction
e U.S. is irrefutably a country of immigrants, the very birthplace of the idea
of a “melting-pot society.” However, the relationship between new arrivals
and the U.S. has not always been a harmonious one: xenophobia has been a
dening and unfortunate aspect of the migrant experience—particularly for
those who arrive and are unable to take advantage of established immigrant
communities or diaspora networks. U.S. immigration policy has routinely
uctuated between relatively welcoming and unapologetically discriminatory
approaches, particularly when it comes to the policing of migration from
Americas southern neighbors. While in some ways, September 11 added a
whole new security dimension to migration policymaking, it also evoked
existing fears: the migrant as a “welfare-parasite,” a “violent criminal” or a
“job thief.
is intensication of scrutiny over immigration has characterized nearly two
decades of U.S. policymaking and has been both a result of, and contributing
factor in, the polarization of public opinion. e triumph of “threat based
initiatives”—the Patriot Act, the Real ID Act and the Department of Homeland
Aairs for example—over what O’Keefe calls “humane approaches” (like
community based supervision programs) has come about as a result of a lack
of political will for permissive policy solutions,
1
both within the electorate and
at a governmental level.
Nineteen years after the emergence of this new security reality, the U.S. has
an administration triumphantly extolling its “tough on migration” policy
credentials while admonishing its predecessor for an apparently lax approach
to border security. is begs the question: does the Trump administrations
aggressive border-security policy represent a substantial deviation from that of
the Obama administration? While White House rhetoric against immigration
has unquestionably intensied, is this indicative of a new conceptualization
of migration security or rather a dierent expression of the same approach?
I will begin by broadly outlining the approaches to immigration taken by the
Trump and Obama administrations, as well as their election commitments.
I will then go on to argue that the same three elements have informed U.S.
immigration policy from 2008 to the present day: the “realities” of post-9/11
national security, the deportation regime and the securitization of the Mexican
border. I will also assert that while the tone of the “speech-act” around the
securitization of migration has undergone a signicant transformation to
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
83
better suit the current political climate, its character and purpose have not.
e security priorities of the U.S. have, for the most part, remained consistent.
As a nal note, I would like to acknowledge that the three elements identied
above considerably predate both administrations. e intention of this paper
is not to provide a historical background to Trumps immigration agenda, but
rather to identify policy continuities between two administrations that have,
at least supercially, vastly dierent public attitudes towards migration.
Trump 2016: Secure Borders, Bad Hombres
If one had to identify a single issue that dominated the 2016 U.S. Presidential
elections, it would be immigration. Between talk of an “uncontrolled
population ow of drug-dealing Latin Americans” and the border wall with
Mexico, Donald Trump was able to
eectively convince (predominantly
white) voters that America was facing
a serious crisis not only at its southern
border, but also within. e two priorities
of Trumps immigration policy were
clear: deterrence, the restriction of both regular and irregular migration; and
deportation, the identication and removal of the countrys eleven million
unauthorized migrants.
2
Taking oce in January 2017, the President elect wasted no time in pursuing his
immigration agenda. Within the rst month of his presidency, he introduced
Executive Order 13769, commonly identied as the “Muslim Ban.” is
sought to bar nationals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from
entering the U.S. Following a challenge in the Supreme Court, the ban was
repealed and revised, with a second travel ban (Executive Order 13780) also
repealed upon review. A nal, more limited travel ban was introduced and
upheld in mid-2017.
To cite a recent example, the approach of the Trump Administration to
the COVID-19 outbreak has been characteristically oriented around the
minimization of perceived security threats from incoming arrivals. Citing
“invisible enemies,
3
Trump declared (via executive-order) the immediate
suspension of immigration to the U.S., with the wording of the order
specically referring to the threat posed to the American labor market.
4
e
administrations preoccupation with the apparent risk posed by migrants
during the epidemic was reected in an earlier decision, made in March, to
If one had to identify a single
issue that dominated the 2016
U.S. Presidential elections, it
would be immigration.
Hugh HUTCHISON
84
close the borders with Mexico and Canada (except for commercial trac).
ose who arrived at the border lacking the proper authorization to enter
the U.S. (including asylum seekers) would no longer undergo processing, but
would rather be immediately turned away.
5
Trumps attempts at pursuing the most highly publicized aspect of his
immigration policy—the border wall with Mexico—have been repeatedly
frustrated by funding issues, precipitating the declaration of a national
emergency (the rst since September 11) and the diversion of public funds
from the Department of Defense. Prior to this emergency declaration, the
U.S. military was deployed to the border with Mexico (“Operation Faithful
Patriot”) to intercept a wave of vulnerable would-be migrants from Central
America. e Trump Presidency, like previous U.S. administrations, has
detained migrants who attempt to enter the U.S. unlawfully. However, a
much-criticized aspect of Trumps immigration reform has been the deterrence
policy of family separation, incarcerating migrant parents and treating their
children as unaccompanied minors. While this policy of zero-tolerance was
ocially reversed after considerable backlash, allegations of institutionalized
family separations continue.
Critical to Trumps acceleration of deportations has been the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). Created in 2003 in the aftermath
of 9/11, ICE has been the most visible and controversial enforcement
mechanism of Trumps immigration policy. ICE’s work is described on the
agency website as being: “critical to the enforcement of immigration law
against those who present a danger to our national security (or) are a threat
to public safety […].
6
Under the Trump administration, Greene states that
ICE’s mandate has been expanded to include “[…] virtually all 11 million
people estimated to be living in the U.S. without authorization.
7
is
elimination of enforcement priorities,
8
or the expansion of what constitutes
a danger to national security,” has been complimented with a massive
increase in personnel and funding: Greene cites a twofold expansion of the
organization since Trump took oce.
9
ICE has also, along with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), been embroiled in scandals surrounding the
aforementioned family separations, along with allegations of sexual assault
of detainees and multiple erroneous deportations of U.S. citizens. ICE has
repeatedly operated outside of its jurisdiction, including in “sanctuary cities
where local authorities have introduced legislation specically disallowing
deportations. Even Catholic churches frequented by irregular migrants of a
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
85
predominantly Mexican, Central and Southern American background have
been targeted, in spite of rst amendment protections.
10
e Obama Administration: Hope, the Status Quo
In the context of the upcoming 2020 Presidential elections, and the promise
of a return to “normality” after the unexpected ascension of Trump and far-
right populist politics in the U.S., the present administration has drawn many
comparisons to that of its predecessor, the Obama-led Democrats. While
many have focused on supercial and abstract notions of “presidential-ness,
the Trump administrations promotion of a crack-down on immigration
and border security as front-and-center policy concerns has led to increased
scrutiny of the Obama Presidencys record on immigration.
e election of Barack Obama was heralded as a seminal moment in
American politics and race relations. Despite his campaign being centered on
hope, his administration was quickly bogged down by the worst economic
recession since the Great Depression
and a number of foreign policy
concerns. e loss of the House of
Representatives in the 2010 mid-
term elections stunted his capacity
to legislate through Congress. As
a result, he was unable to pass a
single item of signicant migration
legislation during his presidency.
Obama was a keen proponent of the
DREAM act (Development, Relief
and Education for Alien Minors),
a non-partisan piece of legislation
rst introduced to the U.S. senate
in 2001. Although it has undergone
a number of changes since its initial conception, the core of the legislation is
the creation of a process by which irregular migrants that arrived as minors
may apply for residency and citizenship. e Obama administration sought to
reintroduce the bill a number of times between 2009 and 2012, however they
were unable to pass it through the hostile Congress. Unable to enact meaningful
immigration reform in the legislature, Obama, through an executive order
in 2012, introduced DACA (Deferred Action for Children Arrivals). is
Obama was a keen proponent of
the DREAM act (Development,
Relief and Education for Alien
Minors), a non-partisan piece of
legislation first introduced to the
U.S. senate in 2001. Although it
has undergone a number of changes
since its initial conception, the core
of the legislation is the creation of a
process by which irregular migrants
that arrived as minors may apply
for residency and citizenship.
Hugh HUTCHISON
86
policy allowed irregular migrants who arrived in the U.S. as children to avoid
deportation and be eligible for a work permit. In 2014, he sought to expand this
program to include the parents of lawful residents of the U.S. through DAPA
(Deferred Action for Parents of Americans). However, this was challenged in
the Supreme Court, which failed to make a ruling, before it was eventually
rescinded by the Trump administration. DACA was also repealed.
Despite these eorts, Obamas attempts at positive immigration reforms
are marred by his legacy as “deporter in chief.” Describing the signicant
increase in deportations compared to the two previous administrations, Hing
writes:
During his eight years in oce, his administration formally
removed more than three million noncitizens, compared
to two million during George W. Bushs tenure and about
900,000 under the Bill Clinton administration… At the time
he left oce, Obama was denitely the reigning deportation
champion.
11
Hing attributes the steep rise in deportation gures to changing enforcement
priorities: namely the formal removal of criminals and those who crossed
the border unlawfully.
12
However the increase in deportations under the
Obama administration dwarfs not only the gures associated with his
predecessors Bush and Clinton, but also those of Trump. At its peak, the
Obama administration deported 409,849 immigrants in 2012, while Trumps
record, despite his rhetoric, amounts to little over half of that gure, with his
administration managing to remove 256,085 deportees in 2018.
13
Securitization, 9/11 and the Enforcement Consensus
According to the Copenhagen School, securitization consists of two inseparable
parts. e rst is the “speech act:” an assertion made by a public ocial that
particular problems, real or perceived, represent an existential threat to the
state and its common values. In order to be “securitized,” the issue in question
cannot be resolvable through ordinary means. Securitization is not a natural
process; rather, “by saying ‘security’ a state representative moves that particular
case into a specic area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to
block this development.
14
What constitutes a securitizable issue varies from
society to society according to its priorities and immediate concerns: Buzan
notes, for example, that “some will securitize culture (the former USSR, Iran),
and some will not (the UK, the Netherlands).
15
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
87
e second component of securitization is the response: if the threat in
question is deemed signicant enough for extraordinary measures to be
legitimized, what public policy decisions are undertaken in order to resolve it?
ese might include the granting of extra-judicial authority to certain actors,
the suspension of ordinary legislative proceedings, or actions that “violate
the constitution, disregard international human rights norms, or even go
against common sense.
16
Securitization can be described as a performative
process: it demands that the securitizing actor (generally a government
entity, but potentially also lobbyists, bureaucrats or union groups) is able to
adequately elevate a particular issue—“either as a special kind of politics or
as above politics
17
—in the eyes of its audience. Without the acceptance of
the audience (the voting public or the controlling elite), the presentation of
a particular issue as being of existential importance is not securitization, but
rather a “securitizing move.
18
e securitization of migration is widely regarded as a relatively new
phenomenon, associated with the conceptual broadening of security
beyond a restrictive, militaristic understanding. Huysmans describes how
the coalescence of migration and security concerns developed alongside the
processes of Europeanisation. He goes on to identify European border policies
such as the Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention as connecting “…
immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border
control.
19
European institutional developments in transnational migration
and intercontinental freedom of movement were informed by a problematized
view of immigration: be it born out of concern over labor markets or the
fear, pervasive in conservative discourse, of multiculturalism as precipitating
societal disintegration.
20
In an American context, immigration security rose to prominence alongside
the concept of “homeland security” in the aftermath of 9/11: an umbrella
approach to the combatting of
a wide variety of threats to the
U.S. and the way of life of its
citizens. As the perpetrators of
9/11 were “foreign nationals
who had entered the country
through legal travel channels,
21
immigration to the U.S. shifted
from a largely economic issue to
In an American context, immigration
security rose to prominence alongside
the concept of “homeland security
in the aftermath of 9/11: an umbrella
approach to the combatting of a wide
variety of threats to the U.S. and the
way of life of its citizens.
Hugh HUTCHISON
88
one of national security. In order to justify signicant and immediate changes
to visa controls, law enforcement and information collection (to name but a
few areas of reform) the U.S. government deliberately drew lines of aliation
between international migration and terrorism. e September 11 attacks
were the precipitating event used to justify an exceptional new attitude and
approach to immigration.
is is not to say, however, that migration was an uncontested political
space prior to 2001. Boswell identies the three most common ways in
which migration was negatively framed pre-9/11: existing border control
as being ineectual in preventing “hordes” of irregular migrants, the belief
that migrants undercut the existing labor market and exploit welfare systems,
and nally the criminal element: the international smuggling of people, arms
and narcotics.
22
What is most apparent about contemporary U.S. migration
discourse is that concerns about the link between migration and terrorism did
not eclipse these perceptions. Instead, two changes occurred simultaneously:
international terror became another element of the migration agenda, and the
three existing “threats” became matters of national security by virtue of the
broader securitization of migration.
ese four issues have informed political attitudes toward migration since
2001 on both sides of politics. 9/11 eectively curtailed any prospect of
comprehensive immigration reform, and sunk an existing proposal by
President Bush in 2000 promising better regional integration with Mexico.
is would have included an armistice on deportations and a huge expansion
of the U.S. temporary worker programs.
23
Migration, be it from the Middle
East or from the southern border, now represented a perceived threat, and
enforcement became normalized as the default policy toward immigration.
One discernable dierence between the Trump and Obama administrations
is that, while both have actively increased the enforcement of immigration,
the latter also promoted legislation that would have allowed for limited
legalization of irregular migrants. In addition to the aforementioned DREAM
act and the introduction of DACA via executive order, comprehensive
immigration reform was oated a number of times between 2008 and 2016.
For example, a paper released by the White House in 2011 argues for both
greater enforcement and legalization. is document argues for four dierent
reforms: the heightening of security measures on the Mexican border, legal
sanctions against businesses that exploit undocumented workers, legal
certication for seasonal agricultural workers and a pathway to legal status
and eventual citizenship for irregular migrants.
24
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
89
ese proposed reforms cover a spectrum of policy responses to migration:
enforcement, legalization and the disruption of institutional factors that
motivate irregular migration. However, as noted by Rosenblum, “the American
political system is strongly biased against comprehensive legislation of any
kind.
25
e short-term political considerations of the Obama administration,
particularly after the results of the 2010 mid-term congressional elections,
disrupted any serious attempts at reform. ere were two immediate problems:
the Democrats no longer commanded a working majority in the House of
Representatives, and enforcement is considered to be the only politically
popular migration policy amongst a majority of voters. Undocumented
migrants are considered to be quantiable manifestations of policy failure,
while enforcement represents a concrete (albeit temporary) solution: “…every
person detained and deported is one fewer unauthorized immigrant in the
United States.
26
As such, the only politically viable options for the Obama
administration were those that adhered to the enforcement consensus.
With the repeal of DACA, Obamas only lasting legacy on immigration
was the expansion of enforcement mechanisms, a far cry from the sweeping
and progressive reforms he promised to enact within his rst year in oce.
Ultimately the Obama administration was constrained not just by political
circumstance, but also by the way in which the post-9/11 attitude toward
immigration has framed unauthorized entry into the U.S. as a crisis of
security. Obama was, as Trump is now, beholden to an electorate whose
views on migration are largely informed by the four perceptions we discussed
earlier: that migration is linked to terrorism, uncontrolled population ows,
worsening economic conditions and international crime. Trump has embraced
this characterization of migration to the U.S., while Obama, despite arguing
for progressive reform, quietly acceded to it.
e Deportation Regime under Obama and Trump
It has already been noted that Obama oversaw more deportations than any
other U.S. president in history, and that Trumps massive expansion of ICE
has not resulted in a numerical increase in arrests and deportations. is
warrants examination in closer detail, not least given Obamas reputation as a
(would-be) progressive reformer and Trumps as an anti-immigration nativist.
Deportation represents the sum total of two dierent actions: removal and
return. Removal refers to a formal court-ordered ejection of an unauthorized
migrant from the U.S., generally with an associated timeframe in which
Hugh HUTCHISON
90
the prosecuted person may not re-enter America. Return on the other
hand, sometimes known as a “voluntary departure,” involves the immediate
repatriation of irregular migrants without a term of incarceration or other
legal sanction.
27
e deportations conducted by the Obama and Trump administrations
have predominantly consisted of removals, while Clinton and Bushs were
overwhelmingly weighted in favor of returns. To illustrate this point, in the
last year of his presidency, Obama
oversaw the removal of 333,593
irregular migrants compared
with just 106,473 returns. e
following year, Trump removed
a similar ratio of 245,364 people
and returned 100,754 others. In
comparison, George W. Bush in
2008 removed 359,795 people, while returning 811,263. In 2000, Clinton
removed 188,467 migrants, while 1,675,876 were returned.
28
A convenient way to conceptualize the dierence between “removal” and
return” is to consider the latter to be an informal ejection from the U.S., while
the former is fully institutionalized, and frequently involves incarceration or
other forms of legal sanction. Two factors can be said to have altered the
balance of returns vis-à-vis removals. e rst is the emergence of ICE as a
removal-oriented law enforcement entity, and the second is a major decline in
illegal border crossings.
29
It can be argued that the emphasis on “formal” deportation is one of the
most apparent continuities between the Obama and Trump immigration
policies. Starting in 2011, the Obama administration began to refer to record
levels of enforcement, explicitly synonymizing removal with deportation.
30
While ICE was founded by Bush, it was Obamas expansion of the “Secure
Communities” deportation program that allowed the law enforcement agency
to proactively remove unprecedented numbers of undocumented migrants.
Secure Communities, which was discontinued by Obama in 2014 and
reinstated by Trump in 2017, was part of a targeted eort to deport irregular
migrants living in the U.S. on the basis of their criminal record.
Described by Kalhan as “the largest expansion of state and local immigration
policing in U.S. history”
31
the Secure Communities program combines local
e deportations conducted by the
Obama and Trump administrations
have predominantly consisted of
removals, while Clinton and Bushs
were overwhelmingly weighted in
favor of returns.
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
91
law enforcement databases with those of ICE, meaning that any person
brought into custody can have their residency status automatically checked.
e automation of immigration policing is a primary factor behind the record
number of removals under Obama. It is also an indication of the extent to
which the belief in immigrant criminality as informing migration policy has
been largely bi-partisan.
32
One often cited dierence between the deportation
regimes of Obama and Trump has been that the former prioritized the expulsion
of irregular migrants with criminal records, while the latter expanded ICE’s
mandate to include the U.S.’ entire undocumented community. However, as
Velez notes, a majority of those deported through the Secure Communities
program have committed either low-level oences or had no criminal record.
She describes how Secure Communities has allowed “…police ocers to pull
over those who look Hispanic to ask them for their IDs, and then get them
deported for merely driving without a license.
33
e scope of deportations has widened signicantly under the Trump
administration, corresponding with the expansion of ICE as an immigration
enforcement agency. Free from their enforcement priorities under the
Obama administration, arrests by ICE increased by 42 percent in the rst
eight months of the Trump presidency.
34
Trump has, in spite of declining
deportation gures, overseen an unprecedented expansion of ICE and its
operational capacity when compared to other law enforcement bodies. He
has also sought, through a now rescinded executive order, to target “sanctuary
cities” that refuse to co-operate with ICE, limiting their access to federal
funding. e Trump administration has clearly, both through its rhetoric and
policing, expanded the scope of migrant criminality to include the entire non-
documented population of the U.S.
However, there are clear continuities between the deportation regimes of
the Obama and Trump administrations. e rst, already discussed, is the
prioritization of removal rather than return. e involvement of formal
law enforcement and judicial proceedings eectively criminalizes re-entry
to the U.S. and disincentivizes repeated border crossings. e second is the
reintroduction of the Secure Communities program by Trump in 2017,
although to considerably less eect. Finally, there is the association of migration
with criminality, or rather the belief that migrants are more likely to perpetrate
criminal acts than their naturalized counterparts. As has been identied earlier
in this paper, the “criminal element” apparently inherent within migration has
become a matter of national security. While Obama may have, in proposing
Hugh HUTCHISON
92
comprehensive immigration reform, stressed the virtues of immigration in
keeping the U.S. “youthful, dynamic and entrepreneurial,
35
his policies
perpetuated the notion that migrants, particularly those arriving from the
Mexican border, constituted a potential threat to U.S. communities.
36
It can
be argued that Trump, a gure unapologetically opposed to immigration,
has done little more than apply nativist rhetoric to an immigration policy
framework that was already oriented around deportation.
e Southern Border as a Security Issue: Obama and Trump
In 2006, then-Senator Barack Obama, along with a number of high-prole
Democrats including Hillary Clinton and Chuck Schumer, voted in favor
of a Republican initiative to approve seven hundred miles of fencing along
the Mexican border.
37
Spokespeople for Donald Trump have identied this
as a tacit recognition on the part of Democrats of the need for a border wall
with Mexico. However, Obamas role in the securitization of the southern
border extends beyond this relatively innocuous vote prior to his assuming
the presidency.
As has already been noted, illegal border crossings under the Obama (and
Trump) administrations have declined dramatically. In 2006, 851,000 people
crossed the border, while in 2016, around 62,000 people made the same
journey. 2011 and 2017, the lowest years in recent record, saw this number
fall well below 50,000.
38
In spite of these gures, however, both presidents
have faced a “crisis at the southern border.” Between 2013 and 2014, there was
a surge in unaccompanied minors arriving at the U.S. border, predominantly
arriving from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. In 2018, migrants from
these same countries arrived at the U.S. border in “caravans.
ese arrivals in particular are complicated by virtue of their being part
of the “complex migration phenomenon” of mixed migration, wherein no
monolithic understanding of population movement can adequately account
for the plethora of possible individual motivations for migration.
39
While the
prevailing assumption is that migrants arriving in the U.S. via the southern
border are predominantly motivated by economic considerations (the “pull”
factors, particularly the prospect of gainful employment),
40
this fails to take
into account that many migrants are driven by the “push” factors of violence,
economic or physical insecurity or personal desperation. To illustrate this point,
Obinna and Field cite an estimated poverty rate of sixty percent in Honduras,
Guatemala and El Salvador, while also noting that political instability and
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
93
high rates of gender-based violence are often motivating factors in the decision
to migrate.
41
In the case of large mixed migration movements—“surges,” as
they were often called in 2013 and 2018—a nuanced understanding of these
diverse motivations is often lost or ignored in favor of a simpler narrative.
e arrival of the migrant caravans from the Northern Triangle of Central
America coincided with the 2018 mid-term elections in the U.S. Trump
actively politicized the issue and used it to push his own anti-immigration
credentials, telling voters in November: “if you dont want America to
be overrun by masses of illegal aliens and giant caravans, youd better vote
Republican.
42
Trump deployed ve thousand U.S. military personnel and
two thousand members of the National Guard to intercept the caravan, detain
migrants who crossed the border and deter further crossings. Although the
zero-tolerance policy of family separation had ocially ended, it is believed
that a large number of separations continued at the border. In eect, a potential
humanitarian crisis was co-opted in service of the further militarization of the
border with Mexico.
43
ere was a precedent for this, however. While the reaction of the Obama
administration was largely more humanitarian, two direct lines of continuity
can be drawn between the responses of the Trump and Obama administrations
to their respective “crises.” Jeh Johnson, then U.S. Secretary of Homeland
Security, “emphasized the need for marked increases in detention and
deportation in order to send a “message” to deter future migration.
44
Many
of the children and families arriving at the U.S. border had been led to
believe, generally by their smugglers, that they would be granted asylum in
the U.S. Instead, the Obama administration requested four billion dollars in
emergency funding to expand the capacity of immigration courts and ICE
detention facilities. Although Congress did not approve the release of these
funds, ICE border detention facilities still underwent signicant capacity
upgrades, including the conversion of male adult prisons into detention
facilities for women and children.
45
ese same border detention facilities, described as “modular barracks among
open yards that torrential rains have turned into mud ats,
46
continue to
be used by the Trump administration, and have been subject to signicant
criticism. While the principle of “family detention as deterrence” has been
expanded under Trump, it has its origins in 2014. Quoting Johnson again:
“Our message is clear to those who try to illegally cross our borders: You will
be sent back home.
47
Hugh HUTCHISON
94
ere is also a precedent for the deployment of military personnel to the
Mexican Border, although in a much more limited capacity. Operation
Phalanx, carried out between 2010 and 2016, distributed 1,200 members of
the National Guard along the southern border. ese troops were responsible
for the removal or return of undocumented migrants and the disruption of
cross-border narcotics smuggling.
48
While the scale of Trumps deployment
was much more signicant, it is worth noting that the militarization of the
southern border was also trialed under Obama.
Conclusion
It is inarguable that the Trump administration has, in both its rhetoric and
its expansion of enforcement mechanisms, pursued a considerably more
aggressive policy toward tackling irregular migration when compared with its
predecessor. It is impossible to divorce, for example, the deliberate separation
of immigrant children from their families, from the administrations stated
desire to deter the arrival of undocumented migrants to the U.S. e expansion
of ICE and the CBP are ideological in nature: Trump campaigned, and was
elected on, the belief that the U.S. was experiencing a migration crisis that
threatened national security.
However, the Obama administration can be said to have legislated within
the same parameters. While its intentions may have been dierent, as
evidenced by repeated attempts at meaningful reform (institutional change
and pathways to legalization), immigration policy within the U.S. has been
eectively homogenized in the aftermath of 9/11. e American electorate
has, for the time being, resoundingly rejected the idea of a comprehensive
overhaul of immigration in favor of the concrete, quantiable and short-term
solution of enforcement.
In recognizing this political reality, the Obama administration established a
number of precedents. e rst, and most critical, was a wide-reaching system
of deportation focused on the formal removal of irregular migrants to the
U.S., informed by a tenuous connection between migration and criminality.
e second precedent was the escalation of security at the Mexican border,
including the deployment of the National Guard as a deterrent to a surge of
migrants attempting to cross into the U.S. is escalation also included the
detention of families in border facilities, a fact acknowledged by Trump in his
defense of his own policy of zero-tolerance family separation.
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
95
Although it is disingenuous to
present Trumps controversial
immigration policy as a direct
continuation of that of his
predecessor, we can instead see
the securitization of immigration
under Obama as a framework
on which the current president
has been able to expand.
While Trumps rhetoric around
immigration is one of open hostility, it can be argued that it is little more than
a radicalized expression of a belief that existed in previous administrations:
namely, that migration is a potential threat to security, one that allows for the
arrival of criminals and terrorists, undermines local labor forces and, if left
unchecked, will result in an endless wave of undesirable and vulnerable people
with whom the U.S. is ill-equipped to deal.
Although it is disingenuous to present
Trumps controversial immigration
policy as a direct continuation of that
of his predecessor, we can instead see
the securitization of immigration
under Obama as a framework on
which the current president has been
able to expand.
Hugh HUTCHISON
96
Endnotes
1 Denis O’Keefe, “Perception vs. Reality: Testing the Viability of a Psychohistorical Interpretation
of the Group reat Approach to Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants and the Role of
Ideological and Personality Traits in Perception Biases,e Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 46, No.
3 (2019), p. 181.
2 Phillip Martin, “Trump and US Immigration Policy,California Agriculture, Vol. 71, No. 1
(2017), p. 15.
3 See President Trump’s tweet on 21 April 2020 at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1252418369170501639.
4 “Proclamation Suspending Entry of Immigrants Who Present Risk to the U.S. Labor Market
During the Economic Recovery Following the COVID-19 Outbreak,e White House, 22
April 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspending-entry-
immigrants-present-risk-u-s-labor-market-economic-recovery-following-covid-19-outbreak
(Accessed 12 May 2020).
5 Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Kirk Semple, “Trump Cites Coronavirus as He Announces a Border
Crackdown,e New York Times, 20 March 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/
politics/trump-border-coronavirus.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article
(Accessed 12 May 2020).
6 See the website of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/about
(accessed 29 December 2019.
7 Judith Green, “Confronting Immigration Enforcement Under Trump: A Reign of Terror for
Immigrant Communities,Social Justice, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2019), p. 86.
8 Emily Ryo, “How ICE Enforcement has Changed under the Trump Administration,e
Conversation, 29 July 2019), https://theconversation.com/how-ice-enforcement-has-changed-
under-the-trump-administration-120322 (15 February 2020).
9 Green, “Confronting Immigration Enforcement Under Trump,” p. 85.
10 Gabriella M. D’Agostini, “Treading on Sacred Land: First Ammendment Implications of ICE’s
Targeting of Churches,Michigan Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 2 (2019), p. 315.
11 Bill Ong Hing, “Deporter in Chief: Obama vs. Trump, SSRN, 1 December 2018, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254680 (Accessed 13 February 2020), p. 5.
12 Ibid, p. 6.
13 Alicia Caldwell & Louise Radnosky, “Why Trump has Deported Fewer Immigrants than
Obama,e Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-trump-has-
deported-fewer-immigrants-than-obama-11564824601 (Accessed 12 February 2020).
14 Ole Waever, Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word, Paper presented at the
Research Training Seminar, Jerusalem/ Tel Aviv, 25-26 June 1989), p. 7, https://www.academia.
edu/2237994/Security_the_Speech_Act_-_working_paper_1989 (Accessed 15 February 2020).
15 Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1998,
p. 24.
Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump
Administrations
97
16 Javier Trevino-Rangel, “What Do we Mean When we Talk About the ‘Securitization’ of
International Migration in Mexico? A Critique,Global Governance, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2016),
p. 292.
17 Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 23
18 Ibid, p. 25.
19 Jef Huysmans, “e European Union and the Securitization of Migration,Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5 (December 2000), p. 756.
20 Ibid, p. 757.
21 Muzaar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, “Post 9/11 Polices Dramatically Alter the US Immigration
Landscape,Migration Policy Institute, 8 September 2011, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/post-911-policies-dramatically-alter-us-immigration-landscape (Accessed 15 February
2020).
22 Christina Boswell, “Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of
Securitization,Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2007), pp. 594–595.
23 Marc Rosenblum, “US Immigration Policy Since 9/11: Understanding the Stalemate over
Comprehensive Immigration Reform,e Regional Migration Study Group, August 2011, p.
2, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-post-9-11policy.pdf (Accessed 12 February
2020).
24 “Building a 21
st
Century Immigration System,e White House, May 2011, p. 3, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf
(Accessed 18 February 2020).
25 Rosenblum, “US Immigration Policy Since 9/11,” p. 14.
26 Ibid, p. 10.
27 Dara Lind, “Removals vs Returns: How to ink about Obamas Deportation Record,Vox,
11 April 2014, https://www.vox.com/2014/4/11/5602272/removals-returns-and-deportations-
a-very-short-history-of-immigration (Accessed 12 February 2020).
28 Joe Ward & Anjali Singhvi, “Trump Claims ere’s a Crisis at the Border: Whats the Reality?”
e New York Times, 11 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/11/us/
politics/trump-border-crisis-reality.html (Accessed 12 February 2020).
29 Olga Velez, “Liberty and Justice for All: e Violations of Basic Human Rights in Detention
Centres Across the United States,U. FLA. JL & Pub, Vol. 25, No. 187 (2014), p. 197
30 Jessica Vaughan, “Deportation Numbers Unwrapped: Raw Statistics Reveal the Real Story of
ICE Enforcement in Decline,Center for Immigration Studies, 10 October 2013), https://cis.org/
Report/Deportation-Numbers-Unwrapped (Accessed 15 February 2020).
31 Anil Kalhan, “Immigration Policing and Federalism rough the Lens of Technology,
Surveillance, and Privacy,Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 6 (2014), p. 1108.
32 omas Miles & Adam Cox, “Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from
Secure Communities,e Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 57, No. 4 (November 2014), p.
938.
33 Velez, “Liberty and Justice for All,” p. 197.
Hugh HUTCHISON
98
34 Franklin Foer, “How Trump Radicalized ICE,e Atlantic, September 2018, https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772/ (Accessed 15 February 2020).
35 “Transcript: Obamas Immigration Speech,e Washington Post, 20 November 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-immigration-speech/2014/11/20/14ba8042-
7117-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html (Accessed 13 February 2020).
36 Leisy Abrego et al., “Making Immigrants out of Criminals: Legal Proccesses of Criminalisation
in the Post-IIRIRA Era,Journal on Migration and Human Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2017), p. 709.
37 Allison Graves, “Fact-Check: Did Top Democrats Vote for a Border Wall in 2006?” Politifact,
23 April 2017, https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2017/apr/23/mick-mulvaney/fact-check-
did-top-democrats-vote-border-wall-2006/ (Accessed 8 February 2020).
38 Ward, “Trump Claims eres a Crisis at the Border.
39 Marina Sharpe, “Mixed Up: International Law and the Meaning(s) of Mixed Migration,Refugee
Survey Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2018), p. 117.
40 Deborah Boehm, “US-Mexico Mixed Migration in an Age of Deportation: An Inquiry into the
Transnational Circulation of Violence,Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2011), p. 5.
41 Denis Obinna & Layton Field, “Geographic and Spatial Assimilation of Migrants from Central
Americas Northern Triangle,International Migration, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2019), p. 83.
42 “Migrant Caravan: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?” BBC News, 26 November 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45951782 (Accessed 15 February 2020).
43 Raymond Michalowski & Frederic Solop, “New Immigration Narratives: Caravans, Family
Separation, and a National Emergency,Oxford Faculty of Law: Border Criminologies, 15 May 2019,
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/
blog/2019/05/new-immigration (Accessed 12 February 2020).
44 Dora Schriro, “Weeping in the Playtime of Others: the Obama Administrations Failed Reform
of ICE Family Detention Practices,Journal on Migration and Human Security, Vol. 5, No. 2
(2017), p. 460.
45 Schriro, “Weeping in the Playtime of Others,” p. 462.
46 Julia Preston, “Hope and Despair as Families Languish in Texas Immigration Centres,e New
York Times, 14 June 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/us/texas-detention-center-
takes-toll-on-immigrants-languishing-there.html (Accessed 8 February 2020).
47 Schriro, “Weeping in the Playtime of Others,” p. 463.
48 Heather Timmons, “By Sending US Troops to the Mexico Border, Trump Repeats a Costly
Obama Mistake,Quartz, 29 October 2018, https://qz.com/1441730/trump-sends-troops-to-
the-border-repeating-obamas-mistake/ (Accessed 13 February 2020).